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This book tells us a story about moral experience and 
about the differences among our moral visions, as human 
beings (or selves) when we are faced with the same situation.  
At the very beginning of his book, Patrick Stokes1 suggests we 
should make a thought experiment. Let’s just say that you and 
I are watching TV at this same moment, as a normal every 
evening habitude. Let’s also say that you and I are quite similar 
with respect to our ‘backgrounds, temperaments, life 
experiences, moral commitments, political views, and religious 
beliefs” (p. 1). Now, given our similarities, one might expect 
that our motivational structures, our ways of seeing things and 
caring about them will be also similar. In other words, given a 
circumstance, one expects that we should experience and 
express the same affective and volitional responses. 
Nonetheless, supposing that we watch the same news on 
TV, for example the events of the Indian Ocean tsunami of 
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December 2004, you and I can experience in different ways the 
terrible human suffering drawn down by the tsunami. We can 
both feel pity, distress and also that something must be done 
but by the time “I sit in my chair and ruminate on the horror of 
what I’ve seen and the urgency of addressing the problem you 
leap from your chair and look up the phone number for the Red 
Cross, so you can call and find out what you can do to help-
make a cash donation? Organize a food drive? Get on a plane 
and join the relief effort? In effect, you have acted, while I have 
continued to contemplate ineffectually without acting” (p. 2). 
  It seems that there is a huge difference between us in 
dealing with the same situation. And it actually is an enormous 
difference but the question here is what makes us split parts? 
Patrick Stokes stresses that while I see the sufferance of the 
people affected by the tsunami as morally compelling, you see 
the suffering of others as also morally compelling but 
compelling you (p. 5). You, without thinking, leave your chair 
and dial the Red Cross number, intending to help while I 
remain in front of the TV unable to translate my emotions into 
action or even into the thought that I should do something. 
Both of our attitudes are in Stokes’s opinion thoughtless but 
between the two of us it is only me who is to be blamed morally. 
According to Stokes the whole problem here is one of 
deliberation. In fact, deliberation is what makes moral 
philosophy so puzzling when facing such an example as the one 
given by Stokes. Instead of treating moral philosophy in terms 
of deliberation, we should understand our moral decisions as 
being more reflexive in character (p. 181). Moreover, Stokes 
suggests that when we actually deliberate (when we think 
about what it is better to do) we risk not rising up moral facts 
but more weighing moral considerations against non-moral 
ones. Stokes’s example here is as follows: “I should stop to give 
that hitchhiker a lift, but I’m worried about my safety and I am 
also running late” (p. 181). 
What Patrick Stokes really wants to bring to our 
attention through this distinction is that it seems “there is 
some non-cognitive element in your apprehension of the 
situation that’s missing from mine, even though our 
apprehensions are identical on the level of their cognitive and BOOK REVIEWS 
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affective content” (p. 5). The distinction lies here in the fact that 
while I react according to an abstract moral attunement to the 
world, your reaction comes totally from your subjectivity even 
though cognitively and affectively we put ourselves in front of 
the situation similarly (we both understand that this is a 
tragedy and we both feel pity and distress and so forth). Stokes 
seems to sustain that it is when a deliberation (thought) gap 
opens up between our moral feelings and our possible reaction 
(or even better, action!) that we fail as moral agents. A moral 
demand should motivate us personally and directly. Referring 
here again to Stokes’s thought experiment, the possibilities of 
helping those victims of the tsunami should appear to you as 
“your possibilities rather than merely possibilities for a 
generalized ‘everyone’, which of course would amount to no one 
in particular” (p. 182). 
That non-cognitive element is to be brought into 
discussion by Patrick Stokes through his book. His thesis is 
that we should “articulate a new understanding of moral 
condition in terms of moral vision rather than normative 
deliberation, good will and so forth” (p. 6). By sustaining his 
assumption, Stokes evokes an author who has an interesting 
view upon moral psychology, namely the Danish philosopher 
Søren Kierkegaard. 
Even though Stokes admits that when treating about 
Kierkegaard we usually foreground his influence on the 
development of twentieth-century Existentialism and strands of 
contemporary theology, the author’s attention is directed 
towards another crucial innovation in Kierkegaard’s work. It is 
what Patrick Stokes refers to as the probing phenomenology of 
moral psychology (p. 7) keeping in mind for his inquiry the 
guiding concept of interesse (interest) and the related one, 
bekymring (concern). 
Since I cannot cover in depth in a short review all the 
issues Patrick Stokes treats in his book I will mainly stress 
upon the most interesting and original aspects as well as upon 
those that are most relevant for his thesis. 
The book is structured in three parts. The first part 
entitled Structures of Subjectivity deals with “the mechanics of META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – II (2) / 2010 
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Kierkegaard’s account of consciousness” (p. 12), with the 
ontology of the self and the role that interesse plays therein. 
Thus, even from the first chapter we can see that 
Patrick Stokes’s main focus is on the concept of interesse 
(interest), one of the concepts belonging to Kierkegaard’s 
psychological vocabulary, along with other more evocative 
terms such as ‘passion’, ‘despair’ or ‘anxiety’. His investigation 
proposes to employ Kierkegaard’s use of the term interesse as a 
vehicle for exploring the role of self-referentiality in 
Kierkegaard’s phenomenology of moral selfhood (p. 18). Stokes 
begins his analysis from the concept of interesting, as being a 
specific aesthetic category. In his famous Either/Or, 
Kierkegaard speaks about the interesting as a key 
determination to be followed by the aesthete’s interest (the best 
example here would be Johannes the Seducer from the 
Seducer’s Diary). 
However, the interesting as an esthetic category might 
produce knowledge but it cannot increase the degree of self-
reflection. This ability of self-reflection is what Patrick Stokes 
tries to determine by introducing the second sense of the term 
interesse (this second meaning would be translated in English 
more often with interest than with the aesthetic interesting). 
This other sense, distinct from the aesthetic one, plays a more 
significant role in Kierkegaard’s account of moral psychology. 
On page 28 Stokes quotes, in a conclusive way, a remark of 
Koch who marks the distinction between the two meanings of 
the term interesse: “Interesse in the esthetic sense is an 
expression for emptiness and despair, interesse understood as 
an essential preoccupation is an expression for striving in the 
direction of the individual.” 
An important part of Stokes’s analyses is represented by 
the parallel he draws between consciousness and the selfhood 
considering that both are sites where opposites are brought 
together. Kierkegaard states that human experience is a ‘place’ 
where opposites collide. In the case of consciousness, we can 
notice the contradiction between ideality and actuality. To put 
it more clearly, language, which is linked to ideality, cannot 
capture what is essential for the experience of the existing 
individual, the ‘actuality’ of their existence. Language can only BOOK REVIEWS 
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organize the realm of particulars by slotting them into general 
categories (p. 43). The strongest example of the failure of 
language is to be found in Johannes de Silentio’s (one of the 
pseudonyms that Kierkegaard used in order to sign his 
writings) presentation of Abraham’s situation in Fear and 
trembling. Abraham cannot articulate anything that in human 
terms might excuse him from attempting to kill Isaac (p. 44). 
  Still, consciousness is the medium where ideality and 
actuality (reality) are related to one another and when this 
relation emerges, interesse (as a sense of involvement) will rise. 
To put it more simply, when you are conscious (about yourself) 
you immediately start to care about things. To be conscious is to 
be interested (p. 57). 
  Turning his attention to the concept of the self and to 
the ontological structure of the selfhood presented by 
Kierkegaard (aka Anti-Climacus) in The sickness onto Death 
Patrick Stokes points out that “The self, too, is a ‘place’ where 
polar opposites (such as infinite/finite, temporal/eternal, 
freedom/necessity) are brought together, apparently in some 
sort of ‘synthesis’. “…just as the description of consciousness as 
a place of collision is inadequate without qualifying 
consciousness as ‘interested’, so too a mere syncretion of polar 
opposites does not, in itself, constitute selfhood” (p. 64). 
In the second part of his book, entitled Moral Vision, 
Stokes continues his analysis from The Sickness onto Death by 
directing his attention towards one specific form of despair: the 
despair of infinitization, the despair which lacks finitude. We 
can create through imagination a fantastic self which carries 
away into the infinite so it becomes further and further 
removed from the concrete, the actual being that he is (p. 74). 
At the same time ethical imagination represents the way of 
apprehending possibility (as the effect of the act of infinitude) 
and actuality simultaneously. As Stokes states, “ethical 
imagination is a faculty for seeing possibility in the world“ (p. 
87). What is to be kept in mind from this whole analysis of the 
imagination is its connection with interesse. Stokes claims that 
the imaginative experience needs a property of self-
referentiality, which he identifies with interesse (as being a 
relationship inter-esse, between beings). Hence, we as possible META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – II (2) / 2010 
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selves visualize our possibilities through imagination, even 
though we as actual selves are not yet them (p. 89). 
  Other important aspects treated by Patrick Stockes in 
the second part of his book are the theme of self-recognition as 
a key description of moral imagination and the metaphor of the 
mirror, as the paradigmatic experience of self-recognition. The 
idea of self-recognition implies “an experience of identifying 
oneself with an ideal self posited in imaginative moral 
contemplation” (p. 95). In other words, to see oneself represents 
the ability of recognizing oneself through one’s imagination 
under ethical and religious determinants. This recognition is an 
immediate and decisive experience. It is a matter of qualitative 
leap “from seeing something to seeing something as what we 
recognize it to be” (p. 101).  
To strengthen his idea Stokes reminds us of that story 
Kierkegaard tells about the drunk barefoot peasant who didn’t 
care about the carriage which was about to drive over his legs 
because he didn’t recognize them with shoes and stockings. 
Stokes appeals to this funny example to illustrate the role of 
vision and interesse in apprehending oneself in one’s concrete 
moral situation. The drunken peasant has to debate in a 
situation where there is nothing to debate. Recognizing your 
own feet is not a matter of epistemic deliberation. The peasant 
lacks in recognizing his own feet even though he can see the 
danger. The peasant fails to do what we would expect from him. 
That is to grasp his situation immediately and get out of the 
way (p. 100). The peasant fails to recognize himself, an 
immediate action which is an intrinsic feature of recognition. 
  Some of the most interesting chapters of Patrick Stokes’s 
book are the ones which discuss the metaphor of the mirror 
(chapters 7 and 8). This experience of looking in the mirror and 
seeing myself is not just one of immediate recognition but also 
an immediate evaluative one. The function of the mirror brings 
to the foreground one’s moral and volitional involvement. This 
self-recognition in the mirror is a matter of seeing our 
involvement in what we contemplate. The involvement implies 
necessarily an evaluative process which confronts us and forces 
us to change the qualifications under which we live (p. 103).  BOOK REVIEWS 
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But what if we can also see the others as a mirror to 
ourselves? Stokes underlines that the ethical and religious 
development along with self-understanding are dependent on 
relating to the others (p. 134). But isn’t it possible to lack in 
seeing the other as distinctive individuality if they are absorbed 
only “as imperatives into an ethical look” (p. 135)? In the last 
pages of the second part of his book Stokes turns to the 
Sickness Unto Death’s construction of moral vision (which 
states a tension between the concrete and the ideal, the actual 
and the imagined individual) (p. 141). The point here is that 
when we look at the other we don’t see “a person and moral 
demand, but a person who constitutes, in their concrete 
specificity, a moral demand in themselves” (p. 141). 
In the last part of the book Stokes discusses around 
subjectivity and objective knowledge and the possible 
suggestion of Anti-Climacus that all fields of human inquiry 
(including astronomy, mathematics and physics which do not 
include me at all) are legitimate “insofar as they tell me about 
myself in a way that speaks to my moral condition” (p. 170). 
The decisive point here would be that Kierkegaard does not 
speak of the object of knowledge but rather about the interest 
that such knowledge presents. Thus more important is what 
motivates the end towards which the process of knowing is 
directed (p. 172). The implication of the self here is not as an 
“object” of knowledge. We would rather say that knowledge of 
“something” is permeated with personal interest. 
There are at least three reasons which in my opinion 
qualify Patrick Stokes’s books as a remarkable appearance on 
the stage of the quite dense second literature written in the last 
decades on Kierkegaard’s thinking. The first reason would be 
the very choice of the concept interesse as the key term of 
Stokes’s inquiry. In the context of the primacy of concepts such 
as despair, anxiety, repetition, inwardness or selfhood, Stokes 
found an important place for interesse in Kierkegaard’s so 
called moral psychology.  
Moreover, the approach of the book is quite interesting 
because Stokes’s way of explaining Kierkegaard’s specific use of 
the term interesse is more thematic than chronological. Thus 
the author does not follow the concept throughout the META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – II (2) / 2010 
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kierkegaardian corpus from the beginning to the end 
underlining each occurrence and every change in meaning and 
context. Stokes points out that this kind of approach would 
keep the philosophical value of interesse at a minor level. 
Therefore his method is “one that seeks to uncover a 
foundational sense of interesse and then show how that sense 
ramifies through Kierkegaard’s more conceptually or 
descriptively fully fleshed works. We move from the 
foundational ontology to the descriptions of cognition and 
imagination in concrete situations and consider how the 
structural features of the ontology express themselves in the 
experiences of actual selves” (p. 11). By reconstructing the 
meaning of interesse Stokes also opens the way for new 
approaches to texts such as Johannes Climacus’s De omnibus 
Dubitandum Est and Concluding Unscientific Postscript to 
Philosophical Fragments or Anti-Climacus’s The Sickness Undo 
Death. 
The last reason that makes this book remarkable is the 
use of that ingenious thought experiment which opens and 
closes Stokes’s study and which makes Kierkegaard’s 
sometimes blunt conceptual discussion lighter. The way you 
acted when hearing about those victims was so immediate that 
your perception, imagination and volition were all immediately 
combined. Stokes says here that this is actually how it should 
be and that this is how we should react to moral demands (p. 
182). But I ( I from the thought experiment) totally miss the 
point in the situation described in the experiment. I am the best 
example of the failure of Kierkegaard’s moral vision (I am no 
better even compared to the drunken peasant because I’ve also 
failed to see my involvement in the situation before me; p. 182). 
And even when, as Stokes writes in the last “scene” of his 
experiment, we (you and me) meet the next day and discuss 
about the tsunami and the victims of it, I lack in understanding 
your actions. Finding out that you called the Red Cross to find a 
way to help makes me feel admiration but according to Stokes 
admiration here is only a strategy of evasion (p. 183). One can 
admire another’s talent in singing or in some other skill while a 
moral exemplary action should stand only as a task of 
emulation. BOOK REVIEWS 
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NOTES 
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